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Abstract 
 
In recent times a number of countries have initiated some important tax reforms to 
eliminate the distortions of double taxation. In this context, Australia adopted a dividend 
imputation system in 1987, while the US employed the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA). 
The analysis in this paper examines the effects on the level of corporate capital 
investment, on proxies for corporate tax rates, financial leverage, liquidity, capital 
intensity and firm size after controlling for the tax reforms. The empirical results provide 
evidence that: (1) dividend imputation as introduced in Australia is an effective way to 
reduce the distortions caused by the traditional system of taxation. (2) Compared with the 
TRA, dividend imputation has been better able to positively stimulate corporate capital 
investment. (3) TRA effect on corporate investment is more pronounced in the US for 
firms having a net operating loss. (4) Individual tax rates play a role in corporate 
investment decisions in both the US and Australia. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Taxation of dividends raises fundamental tax policy issues. The United States 
(US) is still one of the few remaining countries to employ the classical system of taxation 
that fully taxes distributed corporate earnings twice, once at the corporate level, and again 
at the individual level. Kari  and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2002) state that classical corporation 
tax regards corporations and their owners as separate tax entities and therefore double-
taxes their income, first the corporation and then the owners, on dividends and realised 
capital gains. Such a tax system discriminates against the incorporation of business ideas, 
restrains the supply of equity finance necessary for their economic utilisation, reallocates 
resources from the corporate to the unincorporated sector and thus causes an efficiency 
loss to the whole economy. 
The potential misallocation of  resources and the subsequent loss of efficiency 
associated with the traditional corporate tax systems has been the subject of much 
research. For example, Harberger (1962) demonstrates that the traditional double taxation 
on corporate profits causes capital to flow out of the corporate sector, thereby artificially 
reducing capital investment by corporations. This bias against capital investment in the 
corporate sector in turn results in inefficient pricing and consumption of corporate 
products. Gravelle (1991) indicates that these distortions can have significant 
macroeconomic effects, including lower growth of GNP. 
To eliminate the distortions associated with double taxation, Australia has 
adopted an imputation tax system in 1987. This taxation approach works by refunding 
corporate taxes through franking
1 credits associated with dividend payments. Morck 
(2003) recently points out that the US double taxation of corporate income continues to 
affect share values and distorts savings and investment flows. In comparison to 
Australia’s 1987 dividend imputation system
2, the US reformed its corporate tax system 
in 1986 with the Tax Reform Act (TRA). The TRA eliminated much of the preferential 
treatment afforded to capital gains. This Act also contained several other provisions 
which potentially could affect investment. The Investment Tax Credit (ITC) originally 
                                                 
1 A franking account tracks income earned by the company on which corporate tax has been paid. This is 
used only in an imputation system. 
2 For a background discussion of Australia’s dividend imputation system, see Hamson, D., Ziegler, P. 1990. 
The impact of dividend imputation on firms' financial decisions. Accounting and Finance 30, 29-53.   2
enacted in 1962 was repealed, depreciation lifetimes were generally extended and to 
compensate these changes the statutory tax rate was reduced. Australia, implemented 
similar changes to corporate taxation within a few years of the US reforms. (Table 1 
gives a detailed summary of the changes in corporate tax rates and individual tax rates in 
both countries) These reforms in the US may have disrupted the strategic decision 
making of investors, who frequently found themselves either racing to invest in order to 
claim an investment tax credit or delaying investment so as to qualify for a credit after it 
became available. 
The US TRA was passed with significant, but mixed tax incentive effects on 
investment. This reform is widely believed to have increased the marginal cost of new 
investment to firms while in Australia the introduction of dividend imputation and the 
associated tax benefit to shareholders was an attempt to stimulate corporate investment. 
This combination of different dividend taxation systems (classical and imputation) and 
different tax reforms (the American TRA and the Australian introduction of dividend 
imputation) offers an ideal setting for this study. By treating the tax changes in these 
countries as experiments in tax and investment policy, this study compares their relative 
and incremental effects. Although economic conditions differed over time between these 
countries, by including general economic and firm specific measures in an econometric 
model, it is possible to control for the various non-tax variables that affect corporate 
investment. This would enable the effects of the tax reforms to be examined in isolation. 
The aim of this study is to examine and provide empirical evidence of the effects of the 
US TRA and the Australian dividend imputation on corporate investment. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two provides a review 
of the theoretical and empirical literature related to dividend taxation and investment and 
subsequently develops the research hypotheses. Section three presents the empirical 
research design of the study. Section four reports the empirical results. Finally, section 
five provides the overall conclusions of the study.   3
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Literature related to Dividends and Investment 
The impact of taxes on corporate financial decisions has been the focus of much 
research since Modigliani  and Miller (1958). There has been a recurrent controversy in 
the finance and economics literature about the interdependence of investment and 
financial variables. Modigliani  and Miller (1958) argued that the value of the firm 
depends only on its investment policy and not on the method of financing investments.  
This conclusion is the corollary of their assumption of perfect capital markets. The 
opposing view would argue that capital markets are sufficiently imperfect that the firm 
must consider the method of financing in its investment decisions. To this end, Dhrymes  
and Kurz (1967), assuming imperfect capital markets, studied a large cross section of 
American firms from 1951 to 1960. Using single equation and simultaneous equation 
models, they reported substantial interdependence between investment and dividend 
decisions. Dhrymes and Kurz then fitted their model as a cross-section for each of the 
years from 1951 to 1960, and although the independent variables were generally 
significant they did not always have the predicted sign. However, when the equations 
were estimated using simultaneous equation methods, the signs of the independent 
variables were fairly consistent with predictions
3. Their findings led them to caution 
against the use of single-equation models of investment and dividend behaviour. 
Probably the most widely cited of the studies that tests the relationship between 
investment and financing is Fama (1974). Fama used a sample comprising 298 US firms 
over the period 1946 to 1968. Instead of using cross-section data he chose to fit his 
regressions as time series for individual firms and then compared the results across firms. 
Fama found that investment had the expected negative effect on dividends in about 60 
                                                 
3  This conclusion was supported by Mueller, D. 1967. The firm decision process: An econometric 
investigation. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 5887. who conducted a study similar to that of 
Dhrymes and Kurz, even using a similar time period except that he omitted external financing and included 
advertising, research and development expenditures as independent variables. In general his results were 
similar to those of Dhrymes and Kurz. However, Higgins, R. 1972. The corporate dividend-savings 
decision. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 7, 1527-1541., questioned the findings of Dhrymes 
and Kurz with some new evidence from American companies during the period 1961 to 1965. His study 
concluded that dividends were a function of profit and investment but that investment did not depend on 
dividends. His results were consistent with the Miller and Modigliani theorem. 
.   4
percent of his regressions, but that dividends had the expected negative effect on 
investment in only about 40 percent of his time series regressions. He concluded that this 
supports the Modigliani and Miller (1958) position and that there is no evidence for the 
interdependence of dividend and investment decisions. Fama (1974) suggested that the 
difference in his results with those of Dhrymes  and Kurz (1967) arises because they 
omitted certain lagged variables, constrained the parameters of the dividend and 
investment models to be equal for all firms, and chose inappropriate deflators. Fama 
admits, however, that his own results may be influenced by sampling errors that obscure 
the true relationship between dividends and investment. Hence the empirical evidence 
must be considered inconclusive
4. 
2.2 Literature related to Dividend Imputation and Tax Reform Act 
Though the introduction of dividend imputation in numerous countries and the 
TRA in the US has been the focus of many studies, research which focuses on the impact 
of investment flows under both Australian imputation and the American TRA is limited.  
Bellamy (1994) using Australian firm data from 1987 to 1992, examined dividend 
drop-off for dividends with and without credits attached
5. Bellamy, found that the 
dividend drop-offs for dividends with credits attached were significantly higher than for 
those without credits. That is, there was a positive and significant relationship between 
the amount of the credit attached and the amount of dividends paid, implying that 
corporations with tax credits increase their dividends in order to pass these credits to 
shareholders. Bellamy finds support for this notion with the increase in use of dividend 
reinvestment plans since the introduction of dividend imputation. 
Heming (1994) also investigated the impact of dividend imputation on payout 
ratios in Australia. He uses a sample of 145 firms with data for a ten year period either 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion on the literature of dividend and investment see McCabe, G. 1979. The 
empirical relationships between investment and financing: A new look.  Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 14, 119-135., McDonald, J., Jacquillet, B., Nussenbaum, M. 1975. Dividend, 
investment and financing decisions: Empirical evidence on french firms.  Journal of Financial and 
Quatitative Analysis 7. and Peterson, P., Benesh, G. 1983. A re-examination of the empirical relationship 
between investment and financing decisions. Thr Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 18, 439-
453. 
5 Taxation of dividends implies that the drop-off in price when a stock becomes ex-dividend should be less 
than the value of the dividend. Thus, the elimination of the double taxation system is expected to cause the 
drop-off ratio to move closer toward one   5
side the introduction of the dividend imputation system. Employing a univariate 
statistical approach, Heming found statistically higher payout ratios in the post-
imputation period. However, Heming suggested that this finding is unlikely to be the 
result of the imputation system since he finds no difference in the increase of the payout 
ratio for firms that paid dividends with full imputation credits and those that had only 
partial imputation credits. Following Heming (1994), Black, Legoria  and  Sellers (2000), 
using firm data in Australia and New Zealand  from 1982 to 1991, investigated the 
impact of dividend imputation on corporate capital investment. Employing a pooled cross 
section approach, Black et al. found statistically higher corporate investment in both 
countries. In addition separating the firms between high-dividend paying and low-
dividend paying firms, they found that dividend imputation are more pronounced for 
high-dividend paying firms. Black et al. find support for the notion that the “traditional” 
double tax on corporate distribution increases the cost of equity capital to the corporate 
sector and creates a bias against investment by the corporate sector. 
Studies on the impact of TRA and capital flows are also limited. Abrutyn  and 
Turner (1990) use survey methods to analyse the impact of the TRA on dividend payouts. 
The results report reactions and expectations of how CEOs thought they would respond 
to the 1986 TRA
6. Their results indicate that 85% of CEOs surveyed expected no change 
in the dividend payout ratios as a result of the 1986 TRA. Eleven percent of CEOs 
indicated their firms would pay out a higher percentage of after tax profits in the form of 
dividends.   
Bolster  and Janjigian (1991) examined shareholder wealth effects and dividend 
policy changes with respect to the 1986 TRA using a sample of 883 American firms. 
High dividend yield stocks
7 significantly outperformed low dividend yield stocks in the 
period surrounding the passage of the 1986 TRA. Anticipation of the Act caused much of 
the price adjustment to occur prior to the formal passage. Their findings indicate that 
dividends increase monotically throughout the time period 1984 to 1989, with no 
                                                 
6 The time frame of the survey, early in 1988, coincides with the first year that the tax changes were 
complete. The results report reactions and expectations of  how CEOs thought they would respond to the 
1986 TRA. Actual responses could be completely different if investor demand appears to warrant a change 
in dividend payout ratios. 
7 Bolster and Janjigian define dividend  payout  ratios  as total dividends divided by total after tax earnings 
and examine aggregate dividend payouts, focusing only  on the mean and median aggregate dividend 
payments.   6
significant change after the passage of 1986 TRA. Bolster and Janjigian concluded that 
the existence of tax clienteles did not appear to significantly impact corporate dividend 
decisions. In line with Bolster and Janjigian, Means, Charoenwong  and  Kang (1992) 
investigated the changes in dividend yield
8 patterns with the introduction of the 1986 
TRA in US. The authors hypothesised that the introduction of the TRA would cause an 
increase in dividend yields and a decrease in capital gains yield. Their findings indicated 
that dividend yields trended downward over the period 1984 to 1986, while after 1986 
dividend yields moved upwards again. 
The aim of this study is to add to the previous American and Australian literature 
by testing simultaneously the effect of the Australian dividend imputation and the 
American TRA on corporate investment. Specifically, this study undertakes to test the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: As part of the tax reform that permitted the introduction of imputation, 
Australia also introduced a capital gains tax. Prior to these changes Australia operated 
under a classical taxation regime. The elimination of double taxation of corporate income 
and the introduction of a capital gains tax in Australia presents a unique opportunity for 
analysing the effects of a change in the taxing regime. However, the potentially 
counteracting effects of dividend imputation and capital gains tax makes it difficult to 
predict the directional impact on capital investment, hence two hypotheses are developed.  
H1A: If the positive effects of dividend imputation exceeded the negative effects of 
the new capital gains tax, then the net effect of the tax reform on corporate capital 
 investment would be positive. 
 
H1B:  If  the negative effects of the new capital gains tax exceeded the positive 
effects of dividend imputation, then the net effect of the tax reform on corporate 
capital investment would be negative. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Unlike Australia, the US still operates under a classical taxation system 
and as such corporate income is taxed twice. However, in 1986 the US introduced a Tax 
Reform Act which repealed the investment tax credit from its original enactment in 1962. 
The TRA theoretically should have negatively effected investment, as potential 
                                                 
8Their calculations of yearly dividends involve summing monthly dividend yields divided by the 
summation of monthly total yields.   7
investment projects would be required to generate higher cash flows before becoming 
feasible. This leads to the second hypothesis. 
H2  : The introduction of the TRA in 1986 in US had a negative impact on 
corporate capital investment. 
 
To this end, the work of Heming (1994), Black et al.(2000), Bolster  and Janjigian 
(1991) and Means et al.(1992) is extended to a sample of American and Australian firms 
operating under the TRA and  dividend imputation respectively. 
2.3 Other factors affecting Corporate Investment 
While the primary motivation of the study was to investigate the impact of 
Australian imputation and American TRA on investment, it is also necessary to control 
for certain non-tax determinants of corporate investment. Black et al. (2000), Callihan 
(1994), Gupta  and Newberry (1997b), Gilchrist  and Himmelberg (1995) and Stickney  
and McGee (1982), for example, have specified a number of significant non-tax factors, 
which affect a firm’s investment. The most important of these variables are included in 
the empirical model as follows: 
•  Financial Leverage; 
•  Liquidity; 
•  Investment; 
•  Capital intensity; and 
•  Firm size; 
 
 
Debt to Equity Ratio (DE): Financial Leverage may also affect corporate 
investment
9. Gupta  and Newberry (1997a) suggest that the tax deductibility of debt 
would imply that there is a negative relationship between effective tax rates and the level 
of leverage. In other words, differences in marginal tax rates may be driving firms’ 
capital investment and financing decisions. Moreover Black et al.(2000) point out,  in an 
efficient market it is reasonable to assume that capital is provided to firms with better 
                                                 
9 The relationship between financial leverage and investment is discussed fully by Lintner, J. 1956. 
Distribution of income of corporations among dividends, retained earnings and taxes. American Economic 
Review 46, 97-118., Meyer, J., Kuh, E. 1957. The investment decision: Harvard University Press. Boston. 
and Meyer, J., Glauber, R. 1964. Investment decisions, economic forecasting and public policy: Harvard 
University Press. Boston..   8
investment opportunities. Hence inclusion of DE will control for the effect of financial 
leverage. 
Operating Cash Flow (OPR): This is a measure of the firm’s ability to raise 
funds internally to finance its capital expenditures/investments
10. Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995) find evidence that cash flow affects a firm’s capital investment. 
Thus, it can be hypothesised that a firm with higher operating cash flow will be better 
able to raise capital investment.   
Capital Intensity Ratio (CIR):  Stickney  and McGee (1982) recognise that the 
existence of accelerated depreciation provisions and investment allowances meant that 
the effective tax rates should be inversely related to investment in depreciable assets. 
Therefore, it is expected that capital investment by firms with high capital intensity 
would likely be more affected by the tax reforms than firms with relatively lower capital 
intensity.  
Size (SIZE): As argued by Black et al. size of the firm also affects the ability of 
the firm to raise capital and investment. This is measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
Lagged Investment (LINV): Corporate investment can also be correlated with 
investment over succeeding years. The inclusion of a lagged term of PPE is included as a 
measure of capital investment for the prior year scaled by total sales to be consistent with 
the dependent variable. 
                                                 
10 Anderson, L. 1964. Corporate finance and fixed investment: An econometric study: Division of 
Research, Graduate school of Business Administration, Harvard University. and Lintner, J. 1967. Corporate 
finance: Risk and investment, Determinants of investment behaviour. National Bureau of Economic 
Research: New York. provide a discussion of internal liquidity as a potential determinant of investment.   9
Table 1: Tax rates in US and Australia 













1982 46%  50%  46%  60% 
1983 46%  50%  46%  60% 
1984 46%  50%  46%  60% 
1985 46%  50%  46%  60% 
1986 46%  50%  46%  60% 
1987 34%  38.5%  49%  57% 
1988 34%  28%  49%  49% 
1989 34%  28%  39%  49% 
1990 34%  28%  39%  48% 
1991 34%  31%  39%  47% 
1992 34%  31%  39%  47% 
3.0 Research Design  
This section provides a description of the data set used in this paper and the 
procedure used to construct the dependent variable and the regressors, as well as 
including descriptive statistics. The initial testing of the research hypotheses is carried out 
by adding to the empirical model certain variables which proxy for a firm’s tax status and 
other determinants of corporate investment.  
3.1 Dependent variables 
Corporate Investment (INV): Following Kinney  and Trezevant (1993), capital 
investment is measured as the change in gross Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE). In 
addition, similar to Black et al. (2000), a firm’s annual Research and Development 
(R&D) expenditures is added to its change in PPE for each year. Next, consistent with 
Black et al. investment is scaled by total sales, to obtain a measure of investment that 
controls for inflation and growth. Therefore investment is measured by the change in PPE 
R&D divided by sales. 
3.2 Independent variables 
Tax rates (ITR and CRT): As Black et al. point out, Individual Tax Rates (ITR) 
and Corporate Tax Rates (CRT) could impact on capital investment in a number of ways. 
Individual rates indirectly affect the corporate cost of capital through their impact on   10
required pretax rates of return. Corporate taxes clearly decrease the net after-tax cash 
flows from an investment. Hence these two variables are included in the model. 
Tax reform (TREF): This is a dummy variable which will indicate the effect of 
the tax reform. TREF is set 0 prior to the effective date of tax reform and 1 otherwise. 
Therefore, for Australian data TREF is set 0 prior to 1987 (year of the introduction of 
dividend imputation in Australia) and 1 for years after 1987, while for the US, TREF is 
set 0 prior to 1987(year when TRA came into effect) and 1 for years after 1987. As 
discussed before a positive relationship is expected between dividend imputation and 
investment while a negative relationship is expected between the TRA and corporate 
investment. 
Net Operating Loss (DNOL): The effects of tax rate changes on capital and 
investment are likely to be conditioned on a firm’s marginal tax rate. In order to control 
for firms having an operating loss which might then not have to pay any corporate tax, 
firms are classified as NOL
11. More specifically NOL is used as a dummy variable 
whereby it is set to 1 for firms with an operating and 0 otherwise. Black et al. argue that 
this is the best proxy measure for low marginal tax rates. In addition, two multiplicative 
dummies are used, DNOLCRT (DNOL*CRT) controls for the two groups (NOL and 
non-NOL) of firms which are differently impacted by the corporate tax rate changes and 
DNOLTREF (DNOL*TREF) variable will be used to capture the effects of the tax 
reform on NOL firms. A change in corporate tax rates and in the tax legislation should 
not be associated with a reduction of investment. Hence there is no expected relationship. 
3.3 Data 
The sample of firms is from the Datastream International Ltd (2000) Company 
Accounts Database (DICA). Annual cross section data from 1982 to 1992 is used. To 
generate the variables included in the model, information was taken from the DICA 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts relative to five years before and after the 
respective tax reforms. This resulted in a total of 82 firms in USA and 67 firms in 
Australia. Initially data for 1987 was omitted as it was a transition year for the 1986 TRA 
in US and the introduction of dividend imputation in Australia. Many companies may 
                                                 
11 Similar to Black et al.(2000) a firm is classified as NOL if it reported an operating loss during the 
previous year, the current year or the following year.   11
have changed policies dramatically in this year in anticipation of the changes in the tax 
law.  By removing this year from the sample, any distortions created by these fluctuations 
are eliminated from the empirical results.
12 Moreover, only firms that survived for the 
entire period of analysis (1982 to 1992) and have data in each year in the 5-year pre tax 
reform period (1982 to 1986) and the 5-year post tax reform period (1988 to 1992) were 
chosen. If there were missing observations the variables were deleted. This results in a 
potential survivorship bias. A further problem with the data selection technique is that it 
resulted a small sample size of 35 firms and 374 observations for the US and 28 firms 
and 308 observations for Australia. However, this is not inconsistent with previous 
research. In his seminal paper on dividend behaviour, Lintner (1956) uses a sample of 28 
US firms from 1947 to 1953 period, with 196 firm-year observations. Lintner, does point 
out, his research cannot be used to draw statistical conclusions and as such cannot be 
generalised. 
3.4  Regression model 
To investigate the empirical hypotheses, the following cross-sectional regression 
was estimated for both the US and Australia. 
INVit = β0 + β1 TREFt + β2 CRTt + β3 ITRt + β4 DNOLit + β5 DNOLCTRit 
            + β6 DNOLTREF it + β7 DEit+ β8 OPRit + β9  DPRit + β10 TREFDPRit  
            + β11CIRit + β12SIZEit + β13 LINVit + εit                                                                     (1) 
Where:                                                   
INVit     - Investment measured as the change in Gross PPE  plus R&D divided by sales  
TREFt                   -  Dummy variable to measure the introduction of tax reform at time t. 
ITRt     - Individual tax rate at time t. 
CRTt     - Corporate tax rate at time t. 
DNOLit    - Dummy representing firms with an operating loss. If firm have an operating loss 
                              at time t, DNOL= 1, 0 otherwise 
DNOLCTRit  - Multiplicative dummy of an operating loss for firm i, at time t with the corporate tax 
       rate at time t. 
DNOLTREFit      - Multiplicative dummy of an operating loss for firm i, at time t with the tax reform 
       dummy at time t. 
DEit   - Debt-to-equity ratio for firm i, at time t. 
OPRit                          - Operating cash flow ratio for firm i, at time t. 
DPRit     -  Dividend payout ratio for firm i, at time t. 
TREFDPRit  -  Multiplicative dummy of TREF dummy with dividend payout ratio for firm i, at time t.  
                                                 
12The model was analysed a second time using a sample period which includes the omitted year to see if 
there were any significant differences. The results were the same as the original model.    12
CIRit    -   Capital intensity ratio for firm i, at time t. 
SIZEit       -  Measure for size of firm i, as the natural log of total assets at time t. 
LINVit      -    Lagged measure of investment for firm i, at time t. 
 
4.0 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics associated with the dependent variable 
and the independent variables for the regression model. Of particular relevance the mean 
of Corporate Investment (INV), Operating Cash Flow (OPR) and Capital Intensity Ratio 
(CIR) were higher in Australia while Debt to Equity ratio (DE) was higher in the US. 
Table 2: Descriptve Statistics of Regression variables 
USA  INV?  DNOL? DE? OPR?  DPR? CIR? SIZE?  LINV?  PPE?  RD? 
  Mean  0.103 0.094 0.353  0.025  0.270 0.276 4.649  0.103  448.403  76.398 
  Median  0.059 0.000 0.213  0.072  0.300 0.269 4.448  0.059  38.493  19.359 
 Std. Dev.  0.273  0.292  1.943  0.348 1.999 0.132 1.594  0.273 1335.860 170.365 
  Observations  374 374 374  374  374  374  374 374  374  374 
 
Australia  INV? DNOL?  DE?  OPR? DPR? CIR? SIZE? LINV?  PPE?  RD? 
 Mean  1.227  0.101  0.347  0.121  0.489 0.391 6.549  0.834  919.978  4.770 
 Median  0.119  0.000  0.265  0.093  0.520 0.329 6.468  0.080  150.975  0.728 
 Std. Dev.  3.476  0.301  0.352  0.165 0.602 0.686 1.341  3.087 2061.727 19.038 
 Observations  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308  308 
 
Table 3 provides a Pairwise correlation analysis of the variables being used in the 
regression model to check for any correlations which could affect the result of this study. 
Based on the table results, it is unlikely that multicollinearity will be an issue in the 
regression analysis. Of particular relevance is the high negative correlation between 
TREF which measures the effect of tax reform with the corporate income tax rate and the 
individual tax rate. However the non-inclusion of these variables will make it difficult to 
distinguish between the tax reform and the statutory tax rate changes which occurred 
concurrently. For the other variables there do not appear to be significant partial 
correlations.   13
 







   INV  TREF  DNOL  CRT   ITR  DE  OPR  DPR  CIR  SIZE  LINV 
I N V   1               
TREF  -0.02121  1             
DNOL  0.246788  0.102974  1            
CRT    0.021215  -1  -0.10297  1           
ITR  0.037046 -0.96136 -0.10253 0.961359  1             
DE  -0.01867 0.043066 -0.07697 -0.04307 -0.06008  1           
OPR  -0.76426  0.03585 -0.36818 -0.03585 -0.05288 0.038359  1         
DPR  -0.00393 -0.03664 -0.00148 0.036637 0.027807 0.028815 0.003211  1       
CIR  -0.08109 -0.01163 0.014233 0.011634 0.012578 -0.02665 0.103066 0.020422  1     
SIZE  -0.05784 0.087137 0.020294 -0.08714 -0.09074 -0.00491 0.022644 0.038078  -0.14295  1   
LINV  0.646854 0.033918 0.253154 -0.03392 -0.02819 -0.05428 -0.47184 -0.00595  -0.07551  -0.03641  1 
   INV  TREF  DNOL  CRT   ITR  DE  OPR  DPR  CIR  SIZE  LINV 
I N V   1               
TREF  0.323634  1             
DNOL  0.026628  0.199257  1            
CRT    -0.32363  -1  -0.19926  1           
ITR  -0.3345 -0.99504 -0.18885 0.995044  1             
DE  0.077919 0.074385 -0.07491 -0.07439 -0.07619  1           
OPR  -0.01747  -0.0424 -0.08109 0.042401 0.040853 -0.07667  1         
DPR  0.064041 -0.00319 0.071132 0.003186 0.003993 -0.03092 0.045246  1       
CIR  -0.02619 -0.07829 -0.04579 0.078293 0.082201 -0.05558 -0.07214 0.006499  1     
SIZE  0.038194 0.276647  -0.0445 -0.27665 -0.27301 0.017076 0.130956 -0.00933 -0.08403  1   
LINV  -0.0093 0.149774 0.057988 -0.14977 -0.14022 -0.07782  0.08048 0.038486 -0.06699  0.101184  1   14
4.2 Regression Results 
Table 4 reports the results of OLS regressions carried out on each country’s data. 
These regressions were partly carried out to ascertain whether subsequent “pooling” of 
the data is appropriate. The regression analysis is extended in Table 5 by pooling the data 
and estimating the fixed effect specification. This model controls for firm and year 
specific effects which may drive the results from the OLS model. Using a fixed effects 
model, but otherwise all common coefficients and no weighting appears to be more 
appropriate than the OLS estimates which may pick up correlation between firms. Firm 
differences are modelled only with different intercept terms for each equation, other 
coefficients and error variances are assumed to be the same. Harris  and Kemsley (1999) 
use the fixed-effects model in their analysis to eliminate the possibility that a “mean 
cross-firm effect from any correlated omitted variable relating to risk, age, growth, or 
industry explains the primary results.” 
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that between 10 to 58 percent of the 
variation in INV can be explained. In general, the coefficients are stable across time, 
suggesting that pooling of the separate individual firms is indeed appropriate. An initial 
review of the OLS results in Table 4 reveals that the TREF coefficient in the US has a 
positive sign and is not significant. This is contrary to expectations. Based on this result it 
appears that hypothesis (H2) which states that TRA had a negative impact on corporate 
investment in the US, is incorrect. A redundant variable test
13 was then performed. The 
results, indicate that TREF (F=0.6327) does not contribute significantly to the model. On 
the other hand, Table 4 tends to support hypothesis (H1A), as evidenced by the positive 
sign of the TREF coefficient for Australia. Even the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient (p=0.06) are feasible and suggestive of increased corporate investment due to 
dividend imputation.  
                                                 
13 This test compares the estimated likelihood of the full model and the estimated likelihood of a reduced 
model which does not include the variable.   15
 
Table 4: OLS regression for USA and Australia   
Dependent Variable  INV   US  Australia 
Variable Expected  Sign  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
          
C ?  -0.01116  0.9512  -30.5784  0.1645 
          
TREF -/+  0.019428  0.6327  8.799041  0.0571 
          
CRT ?  0.083486  0.8421  -1.82212  0.8395* 
          
ITR ?  0.141197  0.213  53.948  0.1765 
          
DNOL ?  0.102596  0.8706  -1.82333  0.8998 
          
DNOLCRT ?  -0.41855  0.7664  4.252244  0.8963 
          
DNOLTREF ?  -0.00351  0.9818  -0.24094  0.945 
          
DE ?  0.002562  0.5379  0.462771  0.4617 
          
OPR +  -0.46516  0  0.098979  0.9362 
          
DPR -  0.001415  0.9511  0.090818  0.9551 
          
TREFDPR +  -0.00147  0.95  0.352843  0.8305 
          
CIR +  0.001764  0.978  -0.0149  0.9595 
          
SIZE ?  -0.00437  0.4169  -0.15244  0.3682 
          
LINV +  0.329503  0***  -0.05199  0.4045 
          
Adjusted R-squared    0.58628    0.08549   
          
F-statistic   39.04354    3.006275   
         
Durbin-Watson   2.009774      1.930967   
*p   < 0.10 significant at the 10 percent level 
**p   < 0.05 significant at the 5 percent level 
***p   < 0.01 significant at the 1 percent level   16
The fixed-effect estimates as presented in Table 5
14 indicates the model is 
significant for both the US (F=41.25) and Australia (F=41.40), suggesting that this is the 
more appropriate model. For the US the equation has an explanatory power (adjusted R
2) 
of 84.7%, while for Australia it has an explanatory power (adjusted R
2) of 89.01%. This 
implies that the models were adequately specified. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.41 
for the US and 1.10 for Australia. The low DW value for the US may be a result of the 
nature of cross-sectional estimates, which may pick up correlation between firms.  It may 
be realistic to expect different error variances for the different cross-sections. For 
example, Greene (2000) notes that for a cross- country comparison there may be variation 
in the scales of the variables in the model. Visual inspections of the residuals consistent 
with White (1980) and Breusch  and Pagan (1979) indicates that heteroskedasticity is 
present. Consequently, the numbers in parentheses in Table 4 are White (1980) adjusted 
values.  
6.3 Regression Results for US 
The US 1986 tax reform mainly consisted of the repeal of the tax credit, repeal of 
the preferential treatment afforded to capital gains and the extension of depreciation 
allowances. The negative coefficient of TREF (-0.2115) observed from the regression 
results is consistent with what was hypothesised (hypothesis 2). Theoretically it was 
expected that these changes in the 1986 tax reform will have a negative impact on 
corporate investment. This coefficient was significant indicating that it did have a major 
effect on corporate investment from the other variables of primary interest in this study 
CRT and ITR, measuring the corporate tax rate and the individual tax rate changes 
respectively, which both occurred in the US at the same time as when the 1986 tax 
reform was implemented, only ITR was significant. This indicates that the decrease of 
ITR at the same time the 1986 tax reform was implemented had a negative impact on 
corporate investment. CRT was found not to have any statistical significance on 
corporate investment. 
 
                                                 
14 Originally, the models also included a CRT, TREFDPR, CIR and SIZE variables. The increase in the 
adjusted R
2 for the model which includes these variables shows only a .01 percent increase for the US and 
only a .04 percent increase for Australia. A redundant variables test reveals that these variables had no 
statistical significance. Therefore, the final model did not include these variables.   17
The variable DNOL which measures the impact on NOL firms was negative and 
significant. This shows that NOL (earning status) firms were negatively related to current 
corporate investment in US. However, the variables DNOLCRT and DNOLTREF  which  
measures the effect of the tax reform and the change in corporate tax rates respectively on 
firms having an operating loss in a particular year is positive and significant. This 
indicates that the tax reform and corporate tax rates decrease had a positive impact on 
corporate investment for NOL firms. With inference to this result it can be deduced that 
the 1986 tax reform has resulted in a lower marginal tax rate for NOL firms. 
6.4 Regression Results for Australia 
The Australian dividend tax reform mainly consisted of the elimination of double 
taxation. Essentially, the Australian imputation system operates by allowing income tax 
paid at the corporate level to be passed to shareholders in the form of imputation credits. 
It was hypothesised (hypothesis H1A) that if the positive effects of dividend imputation 
on shareholder returns exceeded the negative effects of capital gain taxes on shareholder 
returns, corporate capital investment in Australia would increase after the tax reform. The 
result supports this hypothesis with TREF having a positive coefficient and is significant 
at the one percent level. For the other variables of interest in this study CRT and ITR, 
similar to the US only ITR was positive and significant while CRT did not have any 
statistical significance in measuring corporate investment. DNOL and DNOLCRT were 
significant while DNOLTREF was insignificant in Australia. This indicates that dividend 
imputation had a negative impact on corporate investment while the decrease in corporate 
tax  rates had a positive impact on corporate investment for NOL firms. Hence it can be 
inferred from these results that the introduction of dividend imputation in Australia had 
an overall positive impact on corporate investment.    18













Coefficient Prob.  Coefficient  Prob. 
TREF? -/+  -0.21154  0.2761  5.577467  0*** 
       (0.0431)**    (0)*** 
            
ITR? ?  -0.91589  0.3224  25.48551  0*** 
       (0.0667)*    (0)*** 
            
DNOL? ?  -2.11627  0.0037*** -4.53416  0.0063*** 
       (0.1036)    (0.0002)***
            
DNOLCRT? ?  3.69542  0.0189*** 10.99146 0.016*** 
       (0.1765)    (0.0006)***
            
DNOLTREF? ?  0.585059  0*** 0.342007  0.2014 
       (0.03)    (0.2314) 
            
DE? ?  0.002926  0.5431  -0.3364  0.3268 
       (0.0424)**    (0.2561) 
            
OPR? +  -1.32273  0***  -1.36999  0.0027*** 
       (0)***    (0)*** 
            
DPR? -  0.000458  0.9235  -0.02416  0.7908 
       (0.7068)    (0.4282) 
            
LINV +  0.131717  0.0556***  0.049747  0.0091 
     (0.2839)    (0.0008) 
    
Adjusted R-
squared 
 0.847158 0.89012 
    
F-statistic   41.25064 41.40413 
    
Durbin-Watson   1.416159 1.103178 
White adjusted p-values are shown in bracket with p<0.10=* ,p<0.05=**, p<0.01=***   19
6.5 Regression result for Control variables 
As for the control variables, OPR which measures the operating cash flow ratio 
has a significant and negative impact on investment in both US and Australia. Similarly 
LINV which is a measure of the lag term of capital investment is significant and 
positively related to current capital investment in both the US and Australia. Finally DE 
which measures the debt to equity ratio was positive and significant in the US only. This 
provides some evidence that financial leverage influences corporate capital investment in 
the US. 
7.0 Summary and Concluding remarks 
This paper has conducted an empirical investigation of the effects of tax reform 
on corporate investment in the US and Australia. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the US 
and dividend imputation in Australia affects the tax regime in which corporations operate 
and provide  a rich testing ground for the impact of tax reforms on corporate investment. 
This paper also examines the determinants of corporate investment changes surrounding 
the enactment of the TRA act and dividend imputation. Some non-tax control variables 
that might affect corporate investment are also analysed. This increases the power of the 
regression tests, leading to more conclusive results. Most of the same variables were 
included in the final model of the US and Australia. Finally, the results provide support 
for both hypotheses tested.  
Specifically, the findings of this paper support the assertions of Black et al. 
(2000), Harberger (1962) and Morck (2003) that dividend imputation as introduced in 
Australia was an effective way to reduce the distortions caused by the traditional system 
of double taxation as currently in place in the US. The results provide evidence that the 
introduction of the TRA had a negative impact on corporate investment.  Futhermore, this 
paper provides evidence that individual taxes play a significant role in corporate 
investment decisions in both the US and Australia. Based on these results it can be 
inferred that both the 1986 TRA and the dividend imputation do have an effect on 
corporate capital investment.   20
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